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Infrastructures of Consent: Interrogating Citizen Participation
Mandates in Indian Urban Governance
Karen Coelho, Lalitha Kamath and M. Vijaybaskar
Summary
How does the state ‘perform’ people’s participation and public consultation
exercises in a context where it is increasingly forced to rely on private capital
to build infrastructure? How do these new forms of participation and
consultation articulate with existing institutions of people’s representation? Are
the new mandates for citizen participation and public consultation that are
written into the reform agenda driving a further wedge into the already
fractured citizenship that characterizes the Indian urban polity? These are the
questions posed by this paper.
While ‘participatory development’ itself has come under critique since the late
1990s for its demonstrated effects of disenfranchising marginalised groups,
manufacturing consensus for plans already made, and/or closing off alternative
pathways for transformation, this paper argues that contemporary practices of
public consultation and citizen participation have moved out of the ambit of
such critiques. No longer do they contain more than tokenistic gestures toward
broad inclusion or people’s empowerment. Instead, the imperatives of
‘fast-tracking’ India’s cities into a post-Third World regime of ‘global cities’,
have given new shape and meaning to contemporary practices of participation
and consultation. The paper explores notions of participation as located in
‘second generation’ or institutional reforms, particularly as articulated by
prominent state-sponsored public-private partnerships such as the Bangalore
Agenda Task Force (BATF) and the Tamilnadu Urban Development Fund
(TNUDF). These ‘model’ partnerships provided key programmatic elements that
became the basis of national reform programs, notably the Jawarharlal Nehru
National Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM). The paper also discusses the
emerging character of collective action in Indian cities in terms of its implica-
tions for the unfolding of governance reform measures such as the JNNURM’s
Community Participation Law.
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1 Introduction: new landscapes of
participation and consultation
When exclusive enclaves in hotel ballrooms or corporate conference halls are
termed ‘public consultations’, there is a suggestion of new kind of public being
addressed.1 This suggestion is strengthened by the fact that these enclaves2
sport an increasingly familiar parade of participants, from select academic
institutions, consultant firms, thinktanks, NGOs and professional agencies,
along with the occasional representative of a particularly prominent Resident
Welfare Association. This ‘familiarity’ appears to operate not only within but
across cities in the country: a noteworthy feature of these new sites of
consultation and collaboration is what is emerging as small but tight national
networks of persons associated in various ‘consultant’ capacities with urban
infrastructure investment projects, carrying out tasks ranging from community
mobilisation to preparation of policy toolkits and detailed project reports. The
unexpected (and usually uninvited) entry of members of the urban poor into
these enclaves is a palpably uncomfortable intrusion, especially since
organisers of these events carefully refrain from announcing them too widely in
the popular press.3
These landscapes are reproducing themselves in metros across the country,
and being normalised as a new site of cooperative relations, partnership and
networking between civil society, corporate industry and a web of state and
quasi-state agencies. Many of these meetings are held in fulfillment of
mandatory public consultation requirements in project contracts or in TORs
(Terms of Reference) for consultancies, mandates often pushed by
international financial institutions (IFIs) or bilateral donors and advanced by
urban reform proponents within government.4 A curiously ubiquitous element in
a range of urban reform documents, from mission statements to investment
proposals, and crosscutting sectoral spheres, from water privatisation to
1 For this insight, we are indebted to Rowan Ellis. This paper was presented as the introductory paper
for a workshop with the same title, organised by the authors in Pondicherry in July 2009. We thank the
Center for the Future State at the Institute of Development Studies (IDS) for supporting the research
on which this paper is partly based, as well as the workshop itself. Thanks also to the Center Pour
Sciences Humaine (CSH), New Delhi, for assistance with the workshop, to Anu Joshi for valuable
inputs into the research and the workshop, and Anant Maringanti, Amita Baviskar and two anonymous
reviewers for helpful comments on a draft of this paper.
2 Of the numerous examples of such events, we mention three here: (i) The Consultation held by the
Adyar Poonga Trust, (a creation of the Tamilnadu Urban Infrastructure Financial Services Limited,
charged with eco-restoration of the Adyar Estuary in Chennai) at the elite Madras Boat Club in Aug
2008; (ii) The ‘seminar’ organised by the Chennai Metropolitan Development Authority (CMDA) at the
Grand Madras Ballroom of Hotel Le Royal Meridien in October 2008 to present its revised Second
Master Plan; (iii) the first Citizens’ Summit held by the Bangalore Agenda Task Force (BATF) at the
Infosys Conference Hall in Electronic City on the outskirts of Bangalore in 2000.
3 This enclave trend has supplementary strategies for segregating the public, e.g. by holding separate
consultations for ‘project-affected people’, ‘civil society stakeholders’ and government officials. This
innovation has been mastered by, among others, the Adyar Poonga Trust mentioned above.
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community sanitation contracts to eco-parks and toll roads, is the emphasis on
people’s participation and public consultation. The import of this trend is
evidenced by the inclusion of a Community Participation Law as a mandatory
component of urban reforms across the country (see below for more).
However, in a context where the urban polity is being increasingly polarised by
class, where the spaces for entry or occupation of the urban poor in cities are
more restricted than ever before in the history of independent India (Baviskar
2002; Chatterjee 2004), the programmatic (and physical) settings in which the
discourse of participation is embedded renders the term open to interrogation.
The trend of ‘participatory development’ has itself come under profound and
pervasive critique since the late 1990s. Participatory models of the 1970s, 80s
and early 90s, responding to the failure of the traditional bureaucratic state to
recognise and address the diversity of local realities, were built on the
assumption that involving a plurality of actors would lead to consensus and
hence better outcomes. They envisaged the conditioning of ‘scientific
knowledge’ with ‘people’s knowledge’ to create policies and governance
mechanisms that would be both socially sensitive and more efficient. Most
importantly, these efforts were oriented toward the stated goal of grassroots
empowerment which they held as the touchstone of sustainable development
(Chambers 1997; Tandon 1998). However, scholars of the politics of
development and rule in India have pointed to how the discourse of
participation has often served to disenfranchise already marginalised sections
of the public, through manufacturing consensus for policies already evolved
elsewhere, papering over debates and differences, and closing off alternative
pathways for transformation (Cornwall and Gaventa 2001; Mosse 2001; Kothari
2001). Critiques of the participatory paradigm have highlighted the violence of
its normalising discourses and demonstrated how dominant relations of power
undergird its seemingly neutral spaces, generating acceptance for top-down
plans and proposals. Participation, in these analyses, has been shown to
contribute to a culture of cooptation rather than one of informed deliberation,
empowerment or democratisation (Cooke and Kothari 2001; Harriss 2007).
Other studies since then have sought to highlight the depoliticising dimension
of ongoing participatory techniques through empirical studies (Chhotray 2004,
2007).
In response to the critiques, particularly as compiled in the book Participation:
The New Tyranny (Cooke and Kothari 2001), several attempts have been made
to move debates on participation towards the identification and definition of
more constructive alternatives for radically empowering participatory projects
(Hickey and Mohan 2005; Corbridge et al. 2005). Hickey and Mohan, drawing
on empirical evidence from contemporary processes, conclude that, to be
4 The meaning and content of “urban reforms” are elaborated in Section 2 of this paper, but for the
moment we define the term as a concerted thrust by the central government, in collaboration with
International Financial Institutions (IFIs), to bring government activities at all levels – states, municipal
bodies, departments, parastatals and public sector agencies delivering urban services – under the
commercial disciplines of the market, in particular the financial disciplines required for accessing funds
from private capital markets.
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genuinely empowering, participation must be located within a wider radical
political project which pushes for development as a process of social change,
involving a re-articulation of substantive citizenship rights in favor of
marginalised groups. Corbridge et al. trace how an active civil society has been
able to help citizens to make better use of participatory spaces opened up by
governmental imperatives.
What this paper highlights, on the other hand, is the fact that actual emerging
practices of participation, particularly in the context of contemporary urban
governance in India, far from addressing the critiques or building on the
alternative approaches outlined above, have moved entirely out of their ambit.
No longer do they contain more than tokenistic gestures toward broad inclusion
or people’s empowerment: the imperatives of getting things done, of ‘fast-
tracking’ India’s cities into a post-Third World regime of ‘global cities’, have
given new shape and meaning to the emerging paradigms of participation and
consultation. Caught between urgent visions of neoliberal transformation and
the political exigencies of ‘inclusion’, all ambivalence tends to get smoothed
over with an impatient pragmatism: ‘we know it is all very complex, but we
have to get the job done!!’ In these emergent practices, the means/ends
debates characteristic of older discourses on participation are hardly salient
any more: participation and consultation are frankly deployed with instrumental
purpose, to achieve immediate goals. The ends of people’s empowerment are
readily subsumed to the exigencies of governance in a globally competitive
milieu.
This paper, then, while building on and extending older critiques of participatory
development, tracks new concepts, contexts and collusions through which
participation as a political technology of rule (Mosse 2001, 2003) re-emerges
and operates in neoliberal urban governance in India. It explores how
participatory mechanisms serve the purposes of embedding market-oriented
and financialising reforms in municipal governance, by creating and nurturing
their demand side. These technologies rest on a focused, instrumental and
exigent notion of participation with clear exogenous goals. In tracking the links
between neoliberal reforms and new practices/technologies of participation, the
paper also reprises some of the links explored by the critical writings
mentioned above (e.g. Cooke and Kothari 2001; Chhotray 2007; Corbridge et
al. 2005), between participatory technologies and the negotiation of various
notions, versions and boundaries of citizenship, provoked in this case by the
project of state restructuring that neoliberal reforms comprise. Inevitably, these
negotiations are inflected with the politics of class, caste and gender, as this
paper explores through its discussions (in Section 4 below) on the class-
differentiated and male-dominated landscape of Resident Welfare Associations
and their role in advancing the reform agenda.
Participatory mobilisations have always had the character of performances,
they are staged events in which visual cues, communicative modalities and the
disposition of physical space are important aspects of the message. Earlier
scenes of public consultation (e.g. public hearings, including state-organised
ones) had a ‘populist’ orientation, aiming to display large numbers and diverse
categories of the public. They were often held in open grounds or in large
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community or marriage halls, and employed communication techniques suited
for mass reach, enabled through long-range mikes and loudspeakers.5
However, when ‘participation’ comes to town in the form of ‘public
consultations’, it is stylised in entirely different ways: secure in their
‘manageable’ sizes, these consultations are accommodated in smaller rooms
with sophisticated equipment that can display complex information to
technologically literate audiences. These events are not addressed directly to
‘people’, but to a variety of proxies – usually institutional – that are taken to
represent various sections of the public. The ‘stakeholder’ paradigm now
established in urban governance discourses works on the premise of limited,
identifiable constituencies that have demonstrable stakes in particular projects,
as opposed to a notion of broad public accountability. For example, the
amended EIA (Environmental Impact Assessment) Notification issued by the
Central Government in 2006 permits only ‘local affected persons’ to attend EIA
public hearings in person, while others having ‘a plausible stake’ in the
project’s impacts can only submit comments in writing (MOEF 2006). Thus, the
politics of representation posed by the new paradigms of public consultation
and citizen participation – the question of who can and cannot ‘speak for’
stakeholders – is critical to understand. Also important to note is the tendency
in reform discourses to conflate the terms ‘citizen participation’ and ‘public
consultation’. The more challenging conditions of participation, including a
sustained processual engagement through which programmes have a chance
of being shaped by participants’ inputs, are thus displaced by one-off (or a
limited number of) consultative events in which programmes already developed
through expensive consultancy assignments are presented for feedback, minor
modification, and legitimation by a select public.6
This paper, drawing on case studies of prominent public-private partnerships
(PPPs) in urban development from Chennai and Bangalore, maps the process
through which the notion of citizen’s participation has come to assume new
connotations of depoliticising governance and facilitating market-oriented
reforms in India. We pay particular attention to how the compulsions of
marketisation of services articulate with, transform and supercede existing
institutions of representation such as elected councils of urban local bodies
(ULBs). Pioneering models of PPP and reformed urban governance have, as
we show, been ushered in or accompanied by new formations of middle class
activism in cities, primarily comprising neighbourhood-based resident welfare
5 These mass outreach modes are still employed by popular movements that have been working to
bring about genuine transparency and accountability in government. The Jan Sunwais (public
hearings) and social audits organised by the Rajasthan-based union Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan
(MKSS) and the Delhi-based NGO Parivartan are examples. Underlying this paper is an awareness
that there is a different strand of participatory governance efforts that has brought about significant
recent institutional and legislative changes in India, notably the Right to Information Act (2005), the
National Rural Employment Guarantee Act – NREGA (2005), and the Forest Rights Act (2006).
6 See Cornwall and Gaventa (2001) for a discussion of the distinction between the ‘users, choosers and
consumers’ approach to participation, which primarily relies on consultative devices, and approaches
that emphasise accountability between service providers and citizens through their active participation
in processes of democratic governance.
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associations (RWAs). This ‘new politics’ of civil society has in turn obtained a
privileged space and voice in the unfolding of urban reforms, often at the
expense of elected bodies and of the urban poor.
This paper, then, highlights how the ‘successful’ PPP models of Chennai and
Bangalore inspired the scaling up of new forms of ‘participation’ at the national
level through the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission
(JNNURM), launched in December 2005. The JNNURM, the most ambitious
programme of urban renewal in the country’s history, is poised to bring about
radical transformations of urban spaces and economies through a carrot-and-
stick approach of massive central government funding hinged on the imple-
mentation of a package of neoliberal reforms aimed primarily at rendering cities
more market-friendly.7 Crucially, its funding conditionalities include the passing
of a Community Participation Law in every state, along the lines of the Nagara
Raj Bill that was drafted at the national level, to serve as model legislation for
state governments, by proponents of corporate-led governance paradigms. The
JNNURM has also introduced a Community Participation Fund to incentivise
new forms of local-level activism in cities. Yet, the institutional machinery and
the climate in which implementation of JNNURM is embedded, in city after city,
render these mandates of community participation unclear, even bewildering, to
the public as well as to officials charged with acting on them. Apathy or
resistance to these mandates on the part of local officials and politicians,
and/or a profound lack of capacity in the state or its proxies to deliver on these
demands contribute to distortions and disjunctures in the substantiation of
participatory models on the ground.
Urban reformers, while explicitly supporting democratisation initiatives such as
Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs),8 also tend to possess an anathema for ‘vote
bank politics’. The term itself is a reductive formulation, a trope that compactly
assembles all the vices of populism, patronage, provincialism (and more) that
are associated with local politics and the urban poor. As Benjamin (2008)
points out, this trope has rendered itself into a nightmare for urban reformers of
the turn of the century. If an unrelenting capitalisation of urban space into real
estate by global and pan-Indian financial interests is one concomitant of urban
reforms, this project is constantly challenged, as Benjamin has shown, by the
workings of local politics and the ongoing regularisation of unplanned
occupancies by local economies and residents. Innovations in bringing
participatory governance down to the sub-ward or neighbourhood levels, such
as the Nagara Raj Bill, appear then as strategies to contain and maintain this
risk (Benjamin 2008). As explained in Section 4 below, they potentially provide
7 The mission was launched in recognition of a set of emergent urban realities in India, including
growing rates of urbanisation, the expanding role of cities as engines of economic growth, the
enormous gaps in urban infrastructure given these realities, and the imperatives of attracting private
capital to meet this gap. The mission, covering 63 cities in India, aims to simulataneously bring about
dramatic improvements in the infrastructure base and the governance structures of Indian cities.
(www.jnnurm.nic.in).
8 Panchayati Raj Institutions is the term used to collectively describe local government institutions,
comprising district, intermediate or block and village level institutions, in rural areas.
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an entry point for organised elite, corporate and middle class interests to
reshape the city via the domain of local politics.
How does the state ‘perform’ people’s participation exercises in a context
where it is increasingly forced to rely on private capital to build infrastructure?
How do the new forms articulate with existing institutions of people’s
representation? Are the new mandates for citizen participation and public
consultation that are written into the reform agenda driving a further wedge into
the already fractured citizenship that characterises the Indian urban polity?
While norms of participation may open up spaces of contestation in the case of
state-supported projects, what happens when the market steps in to
dispossess? These are the questions posed by this paper, which is structured
as follows. The following section explores citizen participation as located in
notions of governance and ‘second generation’ or institutional reform. The third
section examines three well-known PPP models to show how they mobilised
discourses of participation to advance the marketisation of basic infrastructure
services. The fourth section then moves to the ‘demand’ side of the reforms
partnerships, to examine new forms and meanings of citizenship, particularly
as reflected in an emergent middle class assertiveness. This section discusses
the implications of the Community Participation Law in the light of these ‘new
politics’ of middle class residential activism. The paper concludes by discussing
the failure of the ‘common good’ thinking that underpins the reforms notion of
urban democracy.
In making its arguments, this paper draws on several bodies of earlier work on
urban reforms and civil society participation by all three authors (see
Vijayabaskar and Wyatt 2005; Kamath 2006; Kamath and Vijayabaskar 2009;
Coelho and Venkat 2009). Each of these works reflect both primary (survey
and ethnographic fieldwork) and secondary data exploring ‘actually existing’
spaces of participation. In addition, it reflects insights from our participation,
partly as academics and partly as activists, in public consultations on various
aspects of urban reforms in Chennai and Bangalore. We also draw upon
newspaper reports and reports produced by civil society organisations.
2 Participation embedded:
governance, second generation
reforms, and institutional design
The drive to depoliticise the running of cities is part of an emerging consensus
that has been systematically forged in India between the reforming state and its
global and domestic ‘partners’ – from financial and lending institutes to the
corporate sector and large sections of urban civil society.9 This vision has been
pursued in different ways, primarily through reform thrusts of corporatising and
commercialising all possible aspects of urban governance. Preparing the
grounds for this consensus has, however, involved a systematic embedding of
these reform principles across the institutional landscape of urban governance.
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This section reviews this institutional turn of what has come to be known as
second generation reforms. First, however, it briefly reviews the concept of
‘governance’ in the context of democratic theory.
Tensions between goals of governmental efficiency and norms of democratic
politics have been brewing for far longer than the history of recent neoliberal
reforms. Partha Chatterjee (2004) argues that in postcolonial polities, the
concept of democracy was transformed through its realisation in modern
states, specifically through the unfolding of a politics of governance. He sees
the ‘governmentalisation of the state’ or the involvement of the state in
provision of numerous services to the public, as a defining characteristic of the
contemporary regime of power. The state’s role of providing for the well-being
of populations elevated instrumental calculations of efficient government over
values of openness, participation and politics, and privileged administrative and
technical expertise over political deliberation and debate.10
Thus, the core notional ingredient of democracy, popular sovereignty, comes to
be subjugated to the imperatives of government. The regime of govern-
mentality, according to Chatterjee, also produced a durable and significant
distinction between ‘citizens’ and ‘populations’. This regime was premised on a
notion of populations to be served, a category separate from that of citizens,
who ‘carry ethical connotations of participating in the sovereignty of the state’
(Chatterjee 2004: 34). Citizens remain a small minority relative to the vast
masses of urban dwellers who, by virtue of their informal, unauthorised and
largely illegal modes of subsistence, carry none of the rights associated with
formal citizenship. The state’s role of governing overtook the modern liberal
political project of producing citizens and creating civil society. The ‘business of
government,’ contends Chatterjee, was thus ‘emptied of all serious
engagement with politics’ (ibid.: 35). And citizens thereby became entirely
distinct from the governed.
While the business of government and the politics of being governed have
genealogies of a century or two, the more recent emergence of the terminology
of ‘governance’ is salient here. The concept of governance masterfully captures
the neoliberal problematique of the state by bringing attention to the qualities,
9 This consensus has been loudly voiced in the English media. The Times of India, in an article entitled
‘If a CEO Runs your City’ (Wednesday 30 July 2003), asked CEOs of well-known corporations in four
Indian cities what they thought was needed to transform Indian metros into world class cities. The one
unanimous element in their responses was: freeing decision-making from politics. Cities, in this
consensus, should be run by managers, not politicians. One CEO said: ‘the city needs a professional
management team with adequate powers and zero political interference.’
10 It is worth quoting Chatterjee on this crucial distinction: ‘This regime secures legitimacy not by the
participation of citizens in matters of state but by claiming to provide for the well-being of the
population. Its mode of reasoning is not deliberative openness but rather an instrumental notion of
costs and benefits… [Thus] in the course of the twentieth century, ideas of participatory citizenship that
were… part of Enlightenment notions of politics have fast retreated before the triumphant advance of
governmental technologies that have promised to deliver more well-being to people at less cost.… All
of this made governance less a matter of politics and more of administrative policy, a business for
experts rather than for political representatives’ (Chatterjee 2004: 35).
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capabilities and methods – the software – of government. Governance provides
a rubric that integrates macroeconomic and structural agendas, sectoral
reforms, issues of corruption and capacity-building, and questions of politics.
Crucially, it addresses these domains across the boundaries of states, markets
and communities: dominant discourses of governance envisage the
commercialisation of state entities alongside the governmentalisation of
corporations, both accompanied by mechanisms for ‘user participation.’ As
John Harriss notes, one of its leit motifs ‘is the idea of the desirability of “part-
nership” both between government and the private sector, and government and
citizens’ (2007: 2716).
The genealogy of the term can be traced in the unfolding of a global politics of
neoliberal reform. The World Bank’s preoccupation with governance originated
in its concerns about the failure of economic reforms and the ineffectiveness of
its assistance in reducing poverty, particularly in African countries. Santiso
(2001) traces the earliest appearance of the term in the World Bank’s 1989
report on sub-Saharan Africa, which identified a ‘crisis of governance’ in the
region. Since then, governance has become a central theme in the global
reform agenda of the Bank’s reform agenda across the world, and con-
comitantly, in the programmes of most other International Financial Institutions
(IFIs) and bilateral donors. In the Bank’s definition, governance concerns ‘the
manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country’s
economic and social resources for development’ (World Bank 1992: 1). As the
Bank’s institutional mandate disallows it from explicitly addressing the political
affairs of a borrowing country, its conception of governance acquired a highly
constrained set of meanings, centering around the technical capacity of
governments to manage development and to design and implement effective
policies.
The governance agenda signals a new moment in the neoliberal agenda, away
from the 1980s approach of ignoring or sidestepping the state, and toward a
recognition of its critical relevance as well as its changing role in facilitating
economic reforms. The World Bank’s World Development Report of 1997,
entitled The State in a Changing World, serves as a manifesto of this new
insight: its problematique is the capacity of the state, framed in terms of
institutional strengths and weaknesses; its vision is of an effective state rather
than a minimal one, a leaner state with nimble and robust political institutions
that can assist in the tasks of steering economic reforms and facilitating
markets. In the Report, all questions of state policy and institutional capacity –
what the state does and how well – are answered in relation to their
implications for private investment. This document also reflects a move away
from pathologising politics to explicitly promoting democratisation, largely in
response to donor pressure (Jenkins 2001; Guhan 1997). However, this
‘mainstreaming’ of democratisation remains pinned within a paradigm of
reforms which aim to procure autonomy from the political sphere through
corporatisation of state operations, accompanied by a (usually vaguely defined)
notion of ‘civil society participation.’ These models of democratisation are
usually predicated on a sanitised model of civil society as a sphere that, by
definition, upholds liberal values in politics as well as in economics.
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11 ‘Second generation reform soon, says Sinha,’ www.expressindia.com/ie/daily/19990430/
ibu30058.html, downloaded on 16 January 2011.
In India, the recent emphasis on reforms in urban governance can be seen as
part of a larger turn toward institutional reform, generally referred to as second
generation reforms (SGRs) (Kale 2002). The rationale for SGRs is the need for
micro- and meso-level shifts to support and sustain effective macroeconomic
transformation. SGRs, then, are about ‘getting institutions right’ to ensure
proper functioning of markets.11 Sustaining reforms, however, requires more
than putting in place regulative and facilitative institutions, it also calls for
evolving strategies to respond to the pressures of a democratic polity.
Implementation of reforms in a ‘post-conditionality’ state necessitates the
neoliberal agenda being bought and owned by local agents. Jenkins (2003)
includes the process of building consensus within the ambit of SGRs. In India,
SGRs therefore involve both institutional and ideological embedding of
neoliberal reforms.
Interruptions, diversions and roadblocks in the reform process have also played
a role in the push for consensus-building. As pointed out by Jenkins and
others, the actual process of implementation of reforms hardly corresponds to
the sequential model. In India, even first generation reforms are far from
complete: fiscal deficits continue to be higher than Government of India targets
or Bank-Fund norms; tariff and non-tariff trade barriers are still high in relative
terms; and the inability to push labour market reforms too far is commonly
raised to highlight the open-ended nature of the reform process (Jenkins 2004).
The relative autonomy of the state vis-a-vis sections of capital and labour, the
power wielded by the bureaucracy, the relationship between multilateral
agencies and the national elite, and shifting equations in the political field, all
shape the direction and pace of the reform process. Thus mediated, the
‘success’ of reforms is bound to be uneven and is likely to generate new
configurations of power. The need to constantly negotiate with interest groups
and confront a democratic polity has, as Jenkins argues, led to a process of
‘reforms by stealth’ which operate side-by-side with SGRs.
A crucial aspect of this twin strategy has been a refiguring of federal relations,
and a new significance attached to institutional structures at the subnational
level. State governments are forced by the central government to undertake
reforms, through disbursements of conditional grants and fiscal disciplining.
This move to discipline state governments through grant conditionalities is
couched in terms of increasing states’ autonomy, a strategy that is politically
appealing in the context of the growing power of regional parties with platforms
of regional autonomy to counter historical neglect by the central government.
Simultaneously, as in other parts of the world, the battleground for investment
has shifted increasingly to cities. In India, where cities still rely in large
measure on grants and other forms of support from the state and central
governments, the 74th Amendment to the Constitution, passed in 1992, has
been translated into an effort to rescale governance by casting cities as
economically viable entities. This was an important enabling piece of reform
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legislation that sought to give more powers to urban local bodies (ULBs) to
mobilise resources for undertaking more functions. Municipal laws were
enacted by many state governments to bring them in accordance with the 74th
amendment. However, as numerous studies have observed (Vidyarthi 2004;
Hamid 2004), implementation of the act has been halting or slow in most
states, so that ULBs have inherited responsibilities (even these often partial)
without the financial (taxing and spending) powers to carry them out.
With the emphasis on fiscal ‘prudence’ in government, untied grants and
budgetary allocations for infrastructure projects from state and central
governments have become increasingly restricted. A series of SGRs have
therefore been unleashed with the aim of enhancing the financial autonomy of
ULBs, and, more precisely, to enable them to raise market resources to fund
their socio-economic development plans.12 As a USAID report put it, ‘The core
issue in these reforms is establishing financial viability and discipline to make
cities more creditworthy and public works projects more “bankable.”’13 The
process of decentralisation thus has allowed for further embedding of
market-oriented modes of service delivery. Reinventing themselves as bodies
capable of attracting private investments, however, requires ULBs to develop
and demonstrate specific capacities, such as the ability to prepare attractive
project proposals showing assets and income flows that can ensure
guaranteed returns to private investors, and convincing investors of their ability
to generate revenue streams toward repayment.14 Part of the ‘capacity-
building’ efforts of ULBs thus comprises the ability to persuade users about the
advantages of paying fees to allow private players to deliver services. The
growing emphasis on participation has to be understood in this context.
12 The Eighth Five Year Plan (1992–97) for the first time introduced a focus on building cost recovery
into the municipal finance system. This was reinforced during the Ninth Plan period (1997–2002) by a
substantial reduction in budgetary allocations for infrastructure development. Metropolitan and other
large cities were encouraged to raise resources from the market to fund their capital investment needs
as well as to cover operational costs of the infrastructure they developed. The landmark India
Infrastructure Report of 1996 published by the Ministry of Finance, Government of India, strongly
promoted reform prescriptions such as a full cost recovery system for infrastructure development and
decreasing government subsidies to the urban poor.
13 www.usaid.gov/in/LookingAhead/strategy4.htm, downloaded on 29 May 2004.
14 In reality, devolution of financial powers and autonomy to ULBs has remained a largely unfulfilled
mandate. Instead, there are countless instances when state governments or their special purpose
agencies make borrowing and investment decisions on behalf of ULBs, committing them to harsh
repayment schedules. For example, the Karnataka Urban Infrastructure Development Project (KUIDP)
drew on funds from the Asian Development Bank (ADB) to provide infrastructure to four towns. The
project was designed by the ADB and the parastatal Karnataka Urban Infrastructure Development
Finance Corporation (KUIDFC), without consulting the four towns, and based on financial projections
that turned out to be completely unrealistic. The project proponents made a case for ULB payback
based on a projected 251 per cent increase in monthly water and sewerage bills (in real terms)
between 1996 and 2005 and a projected 123 per cent rise in property tax collections from 2000 to
2004 (Celestine 2006). When it came time to implement these raises, local councilors and officials
said they could only realise a small increase in property tax collections and tariffs due to both political
and affordability considerations. Not surprisingly, these four towns are now defaulting on their
payments.
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Increasingly, ‘participatory’ mechanisms, civil society mediations and even local
political capital have been enlisted to embed reforms institutionally and
ideologically at the micro and meso levels. The next section embarks on a
description of several well-known partnership models that illustrate how
participation, involving various groupings of citizens, civil society, state
agencies and business corporations, has been used as a supplement to
supply-side reforms. The section opens by discussing a celebrated instance of
public-private partnership: the underground sanitation project of Alandur, near
Chennai. Along with another project, the Greater Bangalore Water Supply and
Sanitation Project (GBWASP, also discussed briefly below), it represents a
partnership model with a focused reform mandate of convincing users/
consumers of the need to pay for large capital schemes that would bring them
drinking water and sanitation. The section then goes on to describe a more
ambitious and overarching partnership model exemplified by the Bangalore
Agenda Task Force (BATF) and its civil society offshoot, Janaagraha.
3 Citizen participation as
supplement to supply-side reforms
3.1 Participation as beneficiary contribution: Alandur and the
TNUDF
A pioneering institutional innovation in the state of Tamil Nadu, namely the
introduction of the Tamil Nadu Urban Development Fund (TNUDF) as a
public-private partnership (PPP) in 1996, illustrates the move to link urban local
bodies with capital markets for financing infrastructure.15 Supported by the
World Bank, this fund is accessible by ULBs in Tamil Nadu through a
competitive bidding process. The TNUDF envisages computerisation of
accounts of all ULBs and a shift to fund-based accounting systems to help
potential investors to verify and compare the finances of ULBs. Urban
development projects are selected based on the feasibility of ULB proposals,
but more importantly, on the ULB’s ability to generate appropriate revenue
streams to pay for their schemes. This mode of project selection has found its
way into the JNNURM.
While the TNUDF itself is seen as a highly successful innovation, some of the
projects it funded have been hailed as particularly successful and replicable
experiments. The Alandur model of public-private partnership in providing
underground drainage has been widely touted as a precedent in the country.
A municipal suburb of Chennai, Alandur has grown rapidly in recent years and
is home to a large middle class population. The Chairman of the municipality in
the 1980s, Mr R.S. Bharathi, was a popular leader who, reportedly, had come
15 This section is drawn from Vijayabaskar M. and Andrew Wyatt (2005).
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to power on a promise of bringing water supply to the municipality, and had
delivered on this promise. His re-election campaign in the late 1990s, this time
on the promise of implementing an underground drainage scheme in the
municipality, coincided with the TNUDF’s early drive to disburse funds to urban
local bodies for infrastructure development through a process of competitive
bidding by ULBs. Bharati returned to power with a strong mandate.
Of the total cost of nearly Rs 337.5 million estimated for the sewerage project,
the municipality raised funds amounting to over Rs 260 million from sources
like the Tamil Nadu Urban Infrastructure Development Corporation (TUFIDCO),
Tamil Nadu Urban Infrastructure Finance Services Limited (TNUIFSL), and the
Government of Tamil Nadu. In addition contributions amounting to over
Rs 80 million accounting for nearly 24 per cent of the total cost, were raised
through beneficiary contributions from the residents of Alandur. After his
re-election, Bharathi mobilised the large-scale support of local residents
including several RWAs in the municipality, and successfully convinced them of
the need to contribute toward the capital costs of the project as well as pay
user fees. There was a long queue on the last day for payment of this
beneficiary contribution, and for the first time in the country, project
beneficiaries had paid nearly one-fourth of the project cost upfront even before
the project was started. However, local RWAs played a critical role in
negotiating the user fees downward.
Interestingly, the Alandur experiment, hailed by the World Bank and other
multilateral agencies as a model for ULBs, failed to travel far. Residents in
other ULBs, even in relatively wealthy ones on the suburbs of Chennai were
reluctant to pay contributions on such a scale. The Alandur case points to how
traditional political goodwill can be deployed in the service of reforms, and
indeed how the reforms shape and in turn are shaped by existing political
institutions. It also indicates how easily categories like ‘participation’ are
divested of their democratising connotations to represent willingness to pay.
3.2 Toward ‘A city run by CEOs’: the Bangalore Agenda Task
Force16
The Alandur experiment, despite its groundbreaking features, was all but
eclipsed in scope and scale by the BATF, a partnership model which
encompassed reforms in multiple spheres and systems, ranging from public
space to solid waste management to roads to property tax assessment and
accounting methods. Its importance can be traced in the programmatic threads
that link the BATF and the citizen movement Janaagraha, that arose from it, to
current municipal reform initiatives in the country.
The BATF represented one of the boldest government initiatives in the country
in formally partnering with the corporate sector in planning and priority setting.
It was initiated by the Karnataka Chief Minister S.M. Krishna in 1999, and
16 This section is largely drawn from Kamath (2006).
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17 In particular, its members were seen to be directing specific interventions and shaping and vetting the
municipal budget which was prepared by the commissioner, prior to its presentation to the council.
See: (a) ‘BATF Officials Accused of Meddling with Budget’ Deccan Herald, Thursday 19 April 2001;
(b) ‘CM Snubs Politicos for Opposing BATF’, Deccan Herald, 24 February 2001).
backed by the city’s Municipal Commissioner (who later joined the World
Bank). This pioneering PPP, launched with the stated goal of turning the city
into a Singapore, provided a powerful impetus for top-down supply-side
reforms focused on reforming and ‘cleaning up’ public sector systems and
processes. The partnership was premised on the belief that the efficiency of
government agencies could be enhanced through collaborative relations with
the resource-rich corporate sector, through employing business models, and
under the auspices of the market. This collaboration also provided business
leaders in the BATF with access to a range of high level decision making
bodies. One member, for instance served as mediator between the city’s
development authority and the company it had hired to prepare the Master Plan
for the city.
Through the creation of a ‘modern’ and ‘efficient’ image for the city, the BATF
acted as an entry point for leveraging private investment both from state
financial intermediaries and from domestic and foreign investors. As in the
TNUDF programme, it pushed computerisation of accounts in the Bangalore
Municipal Corporation (Bangalore Mahanagara Palike or BMP). Fund based
accounting and property enumeration and mapping were also deployed to
enable potential investors to verify and track BMP finances. Since projects
were selected for their visibility, allocation of resources was often skewed
towards neighbourhoods that were better off and in proximity to key
commercial centers. The BATF also focused on increasing the capacity of the
seven state agencies it partnered with to generate revenue from existing
sources and to tap new sources. Many of its projects promoted the concept of
user fees to make projects self-sustaining and even profit-making.
A core tenet of the BATF’s approach was to make governance more effective
by depoliticising it. It worked exclusively with bureaucrats, maintaining a clear
distance from local politicians who were perceived to be corrupt. Several of the
reforms it initiated were introduced through agreements between the state
government and the BMP. Memoranda of understanding (MoU) have the
advantage of allowing radical city and state level reforms to be pushed through
without being debated on the floor of the State Legislative Assembly.
Additionally, the city government was encouraged to sign an MoU with the
state government agreeing to comply with certain reforms as a condition for
receiving constitutionally mandated grants from the State government. There
was thus a clear pattern of eschewing the political process by sidestepping
elected councilors and working closely with the State Chief Minister. This
ensured that the workings of city agencies were monitored and controlled by
the state government to a greater extent than before. It is not surprising that
much of the explicit opposition to this partnership came from elected
representatives, especially from the city council, who saw the extensive
organisational influence of the BATF as overstepping its initial advisory role.17
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Conceptual inputs were provided primarily through the sourcing and hiring of
external consultants at the discretion of the BATF core group. One aim of the
expert-driven and data-reliant planning espoused by the BATF was to define
and enforce legality more strictly so that the growth of the city could be
controlled in the short-term and planned for in the long-term. A deep-seated
need to rationalise and make transparent the actions and procedures of local
government agencies and control the activities of residents led to the BATF
undertaking the codification of regulatory, planning and land use systems, an
operation that posed a serious threat to the informal occupancy systems that
supported the existence of the poor in the city. Several other reforms
propagated by the BATF aimed at directly controlling local governments,
particularly elected councils. Thus, while the Alandur model illustrates the
deployment of political institutions to serve ‘participation’ in marketisation, the
story of the BATF reveals how ‘participation’ has tended to undermine existing
political institutions.
The BATF was also instrumental in giving shape to the new landscapes of
citizen participation, through its exclusive ‘citizen summits’ that were often held
in inaccessible venues, with a select circle of invitees, and methods that
effectively suppressed dissenting voices. The terms of reference for these
consultations were set in advance, and it was clear that citizen participation in
BATF activities would be limited to consultation, with no guarantees that
feedback would be incorporated. The BATF core group posited a trade-off
between efficiency and substantive public participation. Public preferences and
voice were seen to be adequately captured by the consumer polls that they
periodically commissioned from a market research agency.
The BATF made a concerted effort to nurture and build relations with a
particular type of civil society that would constitute the demand side for its
reforms. It contributed in several ways to the growing visibility of RWAs in
Bangalore. Engaging in upgrading one’s neighbourhood became fashionable,
fueled in large part by the BATF’s imagery of the ‘call to service’ and the media
coverage lavished on core group members and other celebrities who undertook
work to benefit their neighbourhood and city. The BATF also directed a large
proportion of its civil society summit invites to RWAs. The entry of a new set of
middle class actors into governance processes lent a supportive voice to the
BATF agenda while devaluing the interests of large sections of the urban poor.
This was reflected in the emergence of Jannagraha – a ‘citizens’ movement for
participatory governance reflecting largely elite aspirations.18
Constituting the demand side for the BATF’s reforms, Janaagraha’s approach
originated from two perceived limitations of the BATF. One, the BATF’s supply-
side focus confined its role to creating mechanisms for public sector reform but
could not ensure its implementation and enforcement. Additionally, as a
creation of government and intimately connected to it, the BATF could not
confront the state on issues concerning power relations between actors within
and outside the state (Interview Janaagraha founder). These limitations
18 For more information see www.janaagraha.org.
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propelled Ramesh Ramanathan, a core group member of the BATF to found
Janaagraha in 2001. The then Infosys Chairman N.R. Narayana Murthy pub-
licly supported and advised both Janaagraha and the BATF.19
The particular salience of Janaagraha for the discussions here lies in its role in
facilitating the collection of Beneficiary Capital Contributions (BCC) for the
Greater Bangalore Water and Sanitation Project (GBWASP). Like the TNUDF
in Alandur, the GBWASP, a public-private partnership, employed a language of
‘citizen as stakeholder’ to equate participation with financial contributions
toward the capital costs of a piped water supply system to the peripheral areas
of Bangalore (Ranganathan et al. 2009). Mobilisations by Resident Welfare
Associations (RWAs) were instrumental in collecting this beneficiary
contribution based on the promise of an assured supply of good quality water.
Janaagraha was officially tasked with mediating citizen participation in the
project toward these ends.20 Besides motivating citizens to pay the beneficiary
contribution, Janaagraha also encouraged the monitoring of illegal connections
and water pilferage (www.janaagraha.org/node/113). However, it withdrew early
on in the project due to opposition from local groups and its reported inability to
obtain ‘cooperation’, including project-related information, from relevant
government agencies. Again, as in Alandur, representations from local RWAs
helped (twice) negotiate a downward revision in the BCC rates, among other
changes. Thus, while there was little project information provided through
formal consultative channels, ongoing, often tempestuous, interactions between
RWAs and local officials enabled a form of incremental participation and some
space for negotiations which, arguably, enabled the project to survive.
Janaagraha’s role as participation intermediary illustrates the consumer-
oriented approach that underpinned all its programmes. Janaagraha’s initial
discourse emphasised strengthening the demands of both middle class and
poor communities; however, the bulk of its work was targeted toward middle
class interests, and attention towards poorer constituencies waned over time
so much so that in 2007 at a National Conference on the JNNURM, Ramesh
Ramanathan, the founder of Janaagraha, described it as an ‘unabashedly
middle class’ institution.21 Its Ward Works Campaign primarily addressed
middle class RWAs, prioritising works like roads and footpaths to facilitate the
smooth flow of traffic and pedestrians. The PROOF (Public Review of
Operations and Finance) Campaign which demanded that the city corporation
disclose quarterly financial statements to the ‘public’, announced a separate
component focusing on poor groups, called ‘PROOF of the Poor’. This
component, however, disappeared over time. The Ankur-SJSRY Campaign,
19 Several interview sources stated that N.R. Narayana Murthy financially supported Janaagraha while
Nandan Nilekani, the then Managing Director of Infosys financially supported the BATF (Kamath
2006).
20 In order to fulfill this role, Janaagraha launched its Participatory Local Area Capital Expenditure
(PLACE) Programme which was both an institutional mechanism to build citizen participation in
GBWASP and a city-wide information campaign.
21 National Conference on the JNNURM titled ‘The Shape of Our Cities and Towns: Socially Inclusive
and Economically Productive?’ organised by CIVIC and INHAF in Bangalore on 26–27 October 2007.
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aimed at improving the functioning of a centrally-sponsored scheme, the
Swarna Jayanti Shahari Rozgar Yojana (SJSRY), to provide micro-credit to
urban poor groups, subsequently morphed into an independent for-profit
micro-finance institution called Janalaxmi. The Taxation with Transparency
Initiative encouraged citizens to be ‘deserving’ of public services by paying
taxes and monitoring their neighbors for tax compliance. Not surprisingly,
Janaagraha’s programmes in Bangalore were resisted by elected councilors,
mid-level government officials, and (advocates for) poor groups.
Despite these local contestations, the far-reaching influence of the TNUDP,
BATF and Janaagraha is revealed by the replication and scaling-up of several
elements of their programmes into the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban
Renewal Mission. For example, Janaagraha’s PROOF programme carried over
into JNNURM as the Public Disclosure Law and Janaagraha’s experiments with
model Area Sabhas became the basis of the JNNURM’s Community
Participation Law. The BATF’s experiments with e-governance and asset
mapping form the basis of the National E-governance Strategy; and fund-based
accounting systems pioneered by the TNUDP and the BATF are mandated for
all urban bodies. These, along with a set of additional measures, constitute a
set of ‘Common Urban Reform Elements’ or CURE that have become the core
of conditionalities that ULBs must comply with in order to receive JNNURM
grants. These agreements are institutionalised through MoUs signed by the
Centre, the state government and the ULBs, another legacy from the BATF.
The entire institutional setup of the JNNURM, like the BATF, seeks to
depoliticise governance by bypassing elected councils and working through
parallel agencies. In fact a member of the BATF went so far as to comment
that of the four men from Bangalore who were at the epicenter of the JNNURM,
three were members of the BATF.22 He explicitly linked the lobbying efforts of
these men with the emergence of the JNNURM:
After the death of the BATF we four continued to lobby for what we called a
national urban mission. We made numerous trips to Delhi at our own
expense and talked to a variety of people. Nandan [Nilekani who was
Chairman of Infosys at the time] used his wide circle of contacts to set up
meetings including with Montek [Singh Ahluwalia, Deputy Chairman
Planning Commission], Manmohan, [Singh, Prime Minister], Sonia Gandhi,
ministers, bureaucrats etc. In time this idea formed the core of the
JNNURM. So we were in effect the catalyst for the JNNURM.
(ibid.)
Two of the BATF members, including Janaagraha’s founder, were also selected
to be a part of the National Technical Advisory Group of the JNNURM, whose
role was to promote civil society participation in the JNNURM.
The next section discusses the emerging landscapes and character of
collective action in Indian cities, and their implications for the unfolding of
urban governance reforms, in particular for the Community Participation Law
mandated by the JNNURM.
22 Interview by Lalitha Kamath with V. Ravichandar on 28 Feb 2007 in Bangalore.
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4 Fractured citizenship and urban
politics
Cities around the globe are experiencing, as Holston and Appadurai (1996)
have argued, ‘an unsettling of the idea of national citizenship’ in which the
twentieth century liberal version, in particular, ‘appears increasingly exhausted
and discredited’ (ibid.: 188). Distinguishing between formal and substantive
citizenship (the former refers to membership in the nation-state and the latter to
the array of rights that people possess and enjoy), Holston and Appadurai
claim that ‘formal membership in the nation-state in increasingly neither a
necessary nor a sufficient condition for substantive citizenship’ (ibid.: 190). This
assertion is amply borne out in the mega cities of India, where expatriate
residents (often project consultants) enjoy entry into spaces – stores, hotels,
clubs and complexes – that are barred to working class citizens of the country,
excepting those employed to serve within these spaces.
One category of response to this devaluation of national citizenship, according
to Holston and Appadurai, has been to pursue increasingly exclusionary
measures to restrict the scope of citizenship and to exclude sections of urban
dwellers. Among them are strategies that
employ urban incorporation to gain the powers of local government. Their
objective is to privatise or dismantle public spaces and services and to
implant zoning regulations which in effect keep the undesired out. Around
the world it is all too common to find homeowner associations using these
powers and privileges of democratic organisation to exclude, discriminate
and segregate.
(ibid.: 191)
In Indian cities, a range of urban collective actors and citizens’ initiatives have
acquired prominence in recent years, involving new sections of the urban
population, and spelling a new politics of urban activism. Prominent among
these are Resident Welfare Associations and other forms of neighbourhood
associations. Metropolitan transformations have provoked unprecedented
mobilisations of the urban middle classes, generating new energy and activism
around agendas of protecting public space and improving services.23 This ‘new
politics’, as Harriss points out, breaks with the old politics in several ways –
rooted in small-scale voluntary associations rather than in the infrastructure of
23 Resident Welfare Associations (RWAs) are the principle form of neighbourhood association in middle-
class localities, while a range of organisations, from self help groups (SHGs), youth groups, local party
or union wings, dalit associations and RWAs exist in poor neighbourhoods. In contrast to earlier
scholarly findings that civil society activism is a domain of the urban middle classes while the poor
move predominantly through political channels (cf. Harris 2005), this study found that the RWA is a
civil society form increasingly being adopted by low-income and even slum-based groups to assert
claims to urban citizenship. The key difference between middle-class and poor neighbourhood
associations is that the latter move more openly and substantially through political channels than the
former.
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24 An ALM is a Resident Welfare Association that is registered with the local municipal ward office and
works to improve the neighbourhood in partnership with civic officials. There are over 500 ALMs in
existence in Mumbai but many are not functional or have few active members.
parties and electoral democracy, located in residential and recreational
domains rather than in workplaces, and employing ‘civilized’ modes of
engagement such as memos, media coverage and courts rather than mass
campaigns, rallies, or demonstrations.
Studies of neighbourhood associations across Indian cities have found that
while these actors have played important roles in demanding and enhancing
access to services such as water, street lights and garbage management, the
character of neighbourhood-based collective action is strongly determined by
class, and has a tendency to be exclusive (Fernandes 2006; Tawa-Lama Rewal
2007; Zerah 2007; Kamath and Vijayabaskar 2009; Coelho and Venkat 2009).
These studies have laid out the different dimensions of exclusiveness in RWAs,
arising from their predication on property ownership or holding in some form,
their caste and other elite leanings, and their self-serving visions of urban
space. Many of these studies have also pointed out that struggles for
democratisation and broader representation of residents in RWAs are
extremely rare, most tend to avoid or preempt elections, and their leadership
remains calcified among older, upper caste men. RWA agendas have
everywhere emerged as oriented primarily toward defending their territories
and amenities against different forms of encroachment by the larger urban
public. Thus inasmuch as RWAs constitute a form of urban civil society, they
appear to constitute a fragmenting, rather than cohesive force.
The new visibility enjoyed by RWAs since the 1980s is in large measure a
concomitant of reforms in urban services. These bodies have received
substantial attention, both in academic and media fora across Indian cities, as
collective actors representing large sections of the middle class and revealing
strong stakes in reforms of urban governance. Elite RWAs in particular have
played an important role in creating acceptance around reform agendas such
as the payment of user fees, enforcing rights based on strict legality, and
conferring priority on property ownership and property values. The
dispossession and dislocation of the urban poor from the city through ‘urban
renewal’, ‘decongestion’ or ‘beautification’ initiatives have also been spurred or
backed by middle class RWAs in most Indian cities. Many RWAs are adopting
increasingly ambitious agendas, moving beyond immediate service-related
demands to longer-term programmes such as electoral reform. Partnerships
between RWAs and the urban state have been institutionalised in some cities
(e.g. Bhagidari in Delhi, Advanced Locality Management (ALMs)24 in Mumbai).
A crucial issue that sustains and motivates the activism of RWAs, more than
amenities or services, is land and/or property. This core thematic is common to
– although it rarely unites – middle/upper class RWAs and low class ones.
Neoliberal transformations of urban space, primarily its pervasive
commodification as property or real estate, have sharpened the class-polarised
politics of collective action over the issue of land. While associations in low-
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income neighbourhoods focus on issues of tenure-security, titles, allotments
and acquisitions, middle class RWAs are concerned with land-use, zoning,
regularisation and the protection of real estate value. As Kamath and
Vijayabaskar’s (2009) study in Bangalore points out, there are conflicts among
different sections of the middle classes over use and exchange values of land
– for example, elite associations in high-value urban neighbourhoods oppose
the unauthorised construction by less affluent property-owning classes in their
neighbourhoods, who seek to profit from the lucrative rental market by building
up their plots in violation of planning norms and procedures. While most city
residents indulge in unauthorised construction, the less affluent tend to use it to
enhance exchange values and income flows from their property, and the upper
middle classes use it to enhance the use values of their property, for instance
by building balconies for bedrooms.
Activism in the arena of land and property values frequently necessitates
political mediation: thus both middle class and low class RWAs tend to cultivate
and maintain political ties in their own, rather distinctive styles. Middle class
RWAs carefully cultivate connections with state-level politicians, particularly
ruling party MLA from their constituencies, and make it a point to maintain good
relations with local politicians. This politics of and over land, which is critical to
the distribution of power among different classes in urban India, however,
rarely finds its way into the ‘consultations’ held under the rubric of urban
reforms. The exclusions practiced in the new fora of consultation and
participation, then, are not only about categories of people but, importantly,
about themes and subjects, particularly related to material struggles in the
urban arena.
Our earlier studies in Bangalore and Chennai (Kamath and Vijayabaskar 2009;
Coelho and Venkat 2009) have found that the growing scholarly emphasis on
the role of RWAs as new voices in urban governance – with assertions of ‘elite
capture’ of urban policy-making – overestimates their significance. Our work
points to a pronounced ambivalence on the part of state agents, both
administrative and political, toward middle-class as well as low-income RWAs.
In Chennai and Bangalore, there are no major state-promoted schemes, like
Delhi’s Bhagidari and Mumbai’s ALM, which invite middle-class associations to
partner with the state in urban governance, apart from some minor initiatives in
traffic or garbage management. Officials at top levels tend to view RWAs as
elite groups driven by a limited, self-interested and exclusive vision. Junior
officials at ward offices also take a dubious view of neighbourhood associations
in low-income areas, seeing them as vehicles to further individual agendas or
under the strong influence of parties. From the official perspective, then, RWAs
do not figure prominently as representatives of the public at large, although
they sometimes serve as convenient shortcuts in processes of mandatory
public consultation.
Thus, while our studies suggest an across-the-board mobilisation of civil
society in the form of neighbourhood associations, both in poor and middle-
class neighbourhoods, these bodies are clearly limited in their capacity to
represent the urban public vis-à-vis the state. While RWAs may achieve the
improvement of routine service and maintenance functions by direct liaison with
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25 For example, in tussles between RWAs and politicians seeking to take land for real estate deals,
RWAs tend to lose, particularly when the contested land stands to personally benefit wealthy and well-
connected actors. However, in cases where public land has been occupied by poor groups with the
support of councillors or other politicians, RWAs have been more successful in ousting them, often in
partnerships with government officials (Kamath and Vijayabaskar 2009).
26 This term is used here to refer to the tendency to treat corporations as citizens (based on the principle
of corporate personhood, wherein corporations are offered the same legal rights as individuals), rather
than the more common usage of the term as referring to corporate social responsibility.
27 The bill provides for the establishment of a third tier of urban governance, the Area Sabha, along the
lines of the Gram Sabha in rural areas, comprising all voters of one polling booth. Each Area Sabha
would elect Area Representatives who would participate in the Ward Committee, which would be
chaired by the Ward Councillor.
agency officials, for larger matters such as relocation of a dump site, re-routing
of bus routes or clearing of encroachments, they are forced to move through
the sphere of politics. RWAs have not, in general, been successful in
influencing issues requiring policy or legislative changes. They also seem to be
ineffective in spheres with strong interest groups under the control of
politicians, particularly in issues of control over land, the determination of who
is ‘unauthorised’, and how they should be penalised.25
There are many reasons why middle class RWAs, despite their disdain for the
domain of politics, find themselves increasingly obliged to seek entry into this
sphere. Contrary to claims – both by scholars and by RWAs themselves – that
associations maintain a distance from party politics, our studies found various
forms of political engagement among middle-class associations. These
included campaigns to encourage voting in state and local elections, efforts to
verify voter rolls and include members, and fielding candidates for local council
elections. The limited success of elite and middle class efforts to reshape the
city has, arguably, moved RWAs to turn to the domain of local politics. The
recent thrust for a ‘Community Participation Law’, outlined by the founder of
Janaagraha, becomes significant when viewed in this context.
4.1 The Community Participation Law: ushering in corporate
citizenship?26
While the Community Participation and Municipal Disclosure (or Nagara Raj)
Bill is being presented by JNNURM as a long overdue step in encouraging
grassroots citizen participation in urban governance through the establishment
of sub-ward Area Sabhas,27 the context within which this democratisation
initiative is framed has given rise to deep suspicion among groups and
movements working on issues of accountability across the country. Among the
numerous concerns that have been articulated is the use of fund
conditionalities to force legislation (on municipal governance) that is
constitutionally within the purview of states. Second, the legislations at the
State level are often drafted by investment agencies and fail to follow
mandated procedures. With telling irony, in all States that have passed the
legislation to date, the bill seeking to enhance community participation was
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28 Houtzager and Lavalle (2009), in analysing various forms of ‘assumed representation’ through which
civil organisations working on urban governance issues in Sao Paolo, Brazil, claim democratic
legitimacy, make a compelling case for considering these efforts as part of a pluralisation of new forms
of political representation outside and alongside the classic forms of representative democracy. Of the
various types of civil organisations they describe, community associations – including neighbourhood
associations – make the strongest claims of assumed representation, justified primarily through
arguments of their proximity to the represented publics, and their role of mediation, or facilitating
access to the state. Crucially, however, as the authors point out, these claims of representation fail to
carry any clear mechanisms of accountability, which forms the paradox of political representation by
civil society actors in participatory governance institutions.
pushed through the legislature in a hurry, with no attempts at public
consultation.
Aside from constitutional and procedural issues, there are concerns about the
implications of the law for the politics of decision-making in cities. By creating
another tier of local government at the neighbourhood level, splintering the
urban local polity into smaller neighbourhood-based units, and seating a cadre
of ‘Area Representatives’ from urban neighbourhoods in ward committees, the
law would potentially institutionalise the powers of the new middle class
leaders and legitimise the exclusionary agendas of neighbourhood
associations. The role of ward councilors, who come primarily from lower
classes, could thereby potentially be minimised and marginalised. The Nagara
Raj Bill, the brainchild of a former member of the BATF and the founder of
Janaagraha, thus potentially constitutes a new strategy for taming or
domesticating politics, in particular the horrors of ‘vote bank politics’, in the
field of urban governance.28
The Community Participation Fund, another brainchild of the founder of
Janaagraha, gives tangible shape to the ideology behind the Nagara Raj Bill.
This Fund, constituted under the JNNURM, gives upto Rs one million to
registered CBOs (Community-Based Organisations) to carry out projects for the
development of their neighbourhoods (here defined as the area to be covered
by the Area Sabha). One of the conditions required for project sanction is
endorsement of 51 per cent of (registered) voters in the area. Such an
endorsement would rule out or greatly reduce the number of projects that
would benefit poor areas alone, particularly in smaller cities where slums tend
to be small, juxtaposed with middle class and commercial neighbourhoods.
This is in line with Krishnaji’s (2007) conclusion drawn from the Democratic
Decentralisation (People’s Plan) experience in Kerala that public expenditure
decisions taken by social consensus rarely result in positive outcomes for the
poor. The complicated and cumbersome application procedure for the fund also
tend to eliminate from consideration smaller CBOs with less educated
members, many of which are from poorer areas.
Most crucially, however, the Model Nagara Raj Bill drafted by the Center
appears to embody a small but significant step in establishing corporate
citizenship in grassroots urban governance. Upto a third of seats in a Ward
Committee can be occupied by ‘the civil society of the ward, to be nominated
by the Municipality’. This ‘civil society’ is to comprise representatives of legally
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registered associations, NGOs, professional, trade or industrial bodies. This
provision becomes particularly significant in light of the substantial powers that
have, in the spirit of genuine decentralisation, been recommended for ward
committees. These committees would have access to all information on (and
inputs into) district and municipal plans and budgets, would have to be
consulted on the development of land use and zoning regulations in the ward,
and can retain up to 50 per cent of the ward revenues for local development.
The committees would also be responsible for drafting ward plans and budgets,
ensuring revenue collection, and establishing the ward infrastructure index.
Ward committees, under this law, would wield planning, surveillance and
allocative powers of far greater reach and magnitude than ward councilors ever
enjoyed under the 74th Amendment. Allocating a third of the seats in this
committee to corporate bodies or NGOs would not only authorise and
legitimate their access to these powers, but would also confer on them rights
equal to those of individual citizens of the country. Additionally, the
municipality’s power to nominate these bodies to the ward committees can
open the doors to more intense wheeling and dealing than any seen in the
domain of vote bank politics.
There is no doubt that the current status quo (non-functional wards committees
and incomplete devolution) does not permit a satisfactory channel for people’s
participation in urban governance. While the 74th Constitutional Amendment
Act (74th CAA)29 mandates the devolution of funds, functions and functionaries
to ULBs, it is left to the discretion of the state government to realise these
mandates. There currently exists no precedent for what participation will look
like on the ground:30 the size of the unit, its roles, powers and responsibilities
and its relations to other tiers, and the conflicts that will inevitably result from
such devolution. Ideally, these issues could be negotiated between (local and
state) elected governments and their citizens through a public process
involving several iterations of rules that lay down operational guidelines. The
Nagara Raj Bill however, far from moving us towards greater transparency and
inclusiveness regarding the design and operation of the third tier of
government, is shrouded in secrecy. Even key officials in state governments
lack information on who is drafting it, the shape it will take, and its potential
implications for their cities. By making acceptance of this Bill a condition for
receiving central grants, there is every chance that cash-starved states will
outwardly accept it (as many have already done), with some even moving to
make it legislative fact, but will make no move to complete the partial process
of democratic decentralisation.
29 The 74th Constitutional Amendment Act of 1992 is a landmark in India’s decentralisation history as it
for the first time recognises ULBs as the third and equal tier of government.
30 While there is no precedent for urban areas, there is much that could be learnt from similar
experiments in rural areas, such as Kerala’s People’s Planning exercise in democratic
decentralisation.
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31 One manifestation of ‘common good’ thinking is the institutional innovation of the CTAG (City Technical
Advisory Group), being sought to be instituted in all cities under the JNNURM as local counterparts to
the National Technical Advisory Group (NTAG). The CTAGs are envisaged as comprising ‘civil society
representatives’, about 6 to 7 individuals in each city, often affiliated with select NGOs from a limited
circle. This structure is based on the conception of the city as a single unit that can be
comprehensively ‘represented’ by a handful of prominent persons – an approach that refuses to
recognise the multiple, contending and contested stakes inevitably present in any project of urban
development.
5 Conclusion: urban renewal and
the ‘common good’
Ironically, it is through the concept of ‘common good’ that neoliberal reformers
seek to reconstitute the project of national citizenship. The notion of common
good which underpins republican ideals of citizenship, has long proved
unworkable as a practical principle of democracy, as it presupposes a
homogeneity of interests and aspirations that is rarely found on the ground,
and perhaps least so in contemporary South Asian cities. In India, as in many
other countries, the principle of common good was long ago supplanted by a
priority on rights wherein ‘the nation of citizens is based not on constitutive
ends but on procedural means of justice which ensure that no particular end
‘trumps’ any other’ (Holston and Appadurai 1996: 192).
The era of neoliberalism, however, reinstates the priority of a common good,
that of rapid economic growth. It is in service of this that urban renewal is
unleashed in mission mode across the country, aided by a variety of toolkits,
training and capacity-building inputs, and, most critically, powered by mega
funds with conditionalities.31 The elevation of economic growth as a hegemonic
national good has, in the discourses and practices of all arms of the state –
legislature, executive and judiciary – come to supercede democratic norms and
procedures that might produce different or dissenting versions of public aspira-
tion. The common good being propagated in authoritative fashion contributes
further to deepening the inequalities that make the concept unworkable.
It is in the language of common good that the middle classes mobilise, even as
they carve out, protect and guard their territories against any form of
‘encroachment’. In their struggles to cleanse and sanitise urban spaces, they
take recourse to normative forms of urban order, represented through
‘scientific’ urban planning approaches (which have never had a purchase on
the real city), even while pervasive elite violations of planning regulations are
normalised as part of urban ‘development’.
The record of urban reforms since the1990s reveals a heavy preponderance of
failed effort, whether in water or electricity sector reforms, decentralisation to
urban local bodies, solutions to urban transportation problems, fiscal balance,
rationalisation of land records, or infrastructure improvements. What these
failures highlight is the unworkably narrow, limited, even distorted concept of
urbanism that lies at the heart of the reformist project. Cities, as many scholars
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have come to recognise, are settled and occupied primarily through informal,
unplanned, sometimes illegal and mostly political routes. The historical record
has shown that urban planners and development authorities – including
public-private partnership bodies like the City Improvement Trusts that were
initiated in many cities in the 1920s and 30s – have rarely been disposed
toward accommodating the city’s working populations within the city. Evictions
and demolitions occurred every time ‘improvements’ or renewals were to be
effected. Large numbers of urban dwellers, then, have historically accessed,
and continue to access, land and housing, water, electricity and other basic
services through informal means.
In the climate of overheated land values obtaining today, there is much less
reason to believe that the urban poor will be accommodated on anything but
peripheral wastelands or swamplands, forcing us to reckon with new social
geographies of urban citizenship and segregation. All of this provides the
backdrop against which we must analyse the attempts of urban authorities to
fast-track their way to inclusive, just urban orders, primarily through infusions of
capital. The idea that ‘taking people along’ on the route to world class cities
can be achieved through a set of procedural arrangements, that people’s
participation and consultation can provide the demand to match supply-side
reforms, and that democratisation means creating some limited spaces for
people’s inputs, clearly call for interrogation.. Democratisation in Indian cities
cannot be achieved through boardroom strategies, legislative mandates or
administrative arrangements. Scholars and activists are recognising that the
struggles of marginalised and excluded citizens for a foothold in the city have
everywhere expanded the scope of democratic practice, and are continuing to
produce new, varied notions of rights and new forms of participation and
democracy including collective citizenships based on particular identities (see,
for e.g. Hickey and Mohan 2005).
Many of these are rooted in claims over embattled space, basic facilities,
funds or knowledge. A strand of recent legislations which have sought to
empower individual citizens with information and voice in governance
(e.g. the Right to Information Act – RTI, the National Rural Employment
Guarantee Act, the Forest Rights Act) have been achieved as a result of long
struggles by people’s movements (like the Mazdoor Kisan Sanghathan Samiti –
MKSS which has been at the forefront of many of these innovations) to force
accountability in governance, particularly in issues fundamental to the lives and
livelihoods of the poor, such as food, employment, land and forest rights, and
government spending on public works and basic infrastructure. Control over
acquisition and distribution of information, embodied in the RTI Act, has proved
a particularly powerful weapon to arm a variety of people’s struggles. The RTI
movement has spread rapidly into urban settings, where it is being used to
access information on issues ranging from leakages in the public distribution
system to unauthorised occupancies of land deemed for public use. Can an
examination of the differences and overlaps in the genealogies, histories,
institutional landscapes, and rationales of these two strands of citizens’
participation and public consultation offer some clues to how the ‘public’, more
broadly defined, can shape the future of Indian cities?
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